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Language, Power, and Identity in the Workplace:
Enforcement of ‘English-Only’ Rules
by Employers
Janet Ainsworth*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the American workplace has mirrored American society
in its increasing ethnic diversity. Employers have responded to this diversity
in the workforce in various ways, sometimes embracing it as a valuable
resource for entrepreneurial success in the modern world, but other times
seeking to suppress it in favor of maintaining a homogeneous workplace.
While no one doubts that employers need to adopt workplace policies that
help make the workplace efficient and safe, certain workplace rules and
practices designed to achieve those goals may well have the effect of
burdening some groups of workers in ways that are tantamount to employer
discrimination. When the burden of workplace rules falls disproportionately
on workers based on their race or national origin, the entitlement of the
employer to impose such workplace regulations is limited by the existence
of employee civil-rights protections. This article critically examines socalled ‘English-only’ regulations imposed by employers on their workers—
rules requiring them to speak only English in the workplace on pain of
being disciplined or even discharged for speaking in any language other
than English.
The starting point for any discussion of employee rights in the workplace
begins with civil rights law enacted to protect workers from discriminatory
treatment. Workers are protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 from employer discrimination based on their race or national origin.
Thus, workers cannot be discriminated against in hiring or in the terms of
employment on the basis of those legally protected characteristics or
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identities. However, the Civil Rights Act contains no express prohibition
against discrimination in employment based on the language that a worker
speaks. Even though an individual’s language use may be strongly
correlated with membership in a racial or ethnic group that is protected
under the Civil Rights Act, the Act does not by its own terms provide legal
protection from discrimination on the basis of language usage. This article
will argue that courts should construe the application of ‘English-only’ rules
as impermissible discrimination under the Act, and that their general failure
to do so arises from ideological beliefs about language in society that fly in
the face of what psycholinguistics tells us about bilingual language use and
what sociolinguistics tells us about the relationship between language and
social identity.

II. ‘ENGLISH-ONLY’ RULES AND CIVIL RIGHTS
By ‘English-only’ rules, I am referring to employer-imposed rules on
language use in the workplace that mandate exclusive use of English and
impose sanctions, including being fired, on workers who fail to comply.1 In
some cases, even minor violations of the rule have resulted in workers
losing their jobs. For example, in one case, an employee who uttered the
three words in Spanish “¿Dónde lo quieres?” [“where do you want it?”],
responding to a request that he move something, was fired for using that
phrase.2 In another case, a worker’s use of the Spanish phrase “no hay más”
[“there’s no more”] led to his dismissal for violating an ‘English-only’
policy.3 Workers have been fired in some instances for using their native
languages even on breaks or at lunch as long as they were on the premises
of the worksite.4 In short, ‘English-only’ workplace rules constitute an everpresent danger for the worker whose native language is not English, where a
single slip can cost a job.
‘English-only’ rules that restrict a workers’ language use in the
workplace appear to be of relatively recent origin, but the past three decades
have seen increasing utilization of such rules with resulting litigation
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challenging their legality.5 Some of the legal challenges to ‘English-only’
rules have come from fired or disciplined workers, and some from workers
seeking preemptively to enjoin the prospective enforcement of the policy.
The early federal judicial opinions regarding the legality of ‘English-only’
rules accepted the argument that policies penalizing workers for speaking
foreign languages when those languages were associated with racial and
ethnic identity was no different from direct discrimination based on race
and national origin. One of the earliest federal cases considering the legality
of ‘English-only’ rules related not to employment but rather to public
accommodations. In Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, a Spanish-speaking patron
filed suit to invalidate a tavern’s policy of denying admission to patrons
unless they spoke English.6 The court in that case had no difficulty seeing
that the rule amounted to unlawful discrimination against Hispanic
customers. In recent decades, however, federal courts have rejected those
early precedents and have increasingly held that ‘English-only’ workplace
rules do not violate employees’ civil rights.7
‘English-only’ policies have also been imposed in contexts other than the
workplace. For example, prisons have begun to impose restrictions on
prisoners’ use of languages other than English, and courts have routinely
upheld prison requirements that all mail sent or received by inmates be
exclusively in English,8 that all telephone calls between inmates and their
families and friends be conducted in English,9 and that all conversations
between prisoners during their work assignments be in English.10 Such bans
are not confined only to prisons either. Some public school districts have
started to impose ‘English-only’ rules on their students. In one such case, a
school district forbade students from speaking any language other than
English, even in their playground and lunchroom conversations, on pain of
being suspended from school.11 The federal district court upheld the
school’s right to punish children for failing to observe the ban on languages
other than English.12
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Such cases in other contexts parallel the growing trend by employers to
impose language restrictions on their employees, often in situations in
which such restrictions appear counterproductive to sound workplace
management. For example, in a Florida case, a child-welfare caseworker
was disciplined for speaking Spanish while interacting with a Spanishspeaking client.13 In another case, a doctor hired a bilingual office manager
specifically for her ability to communicate with the doctor’s Spanishspeaking patients.14 The office manager was fired for what her Englishspeaking supervisor apparently felt was an excessive use of Spanish with
their mainly Spanish-speaking clientele.15 In yet a third case, a taxi service
imposed an ‘English-only’ rule on its drivers across the board,
notwithstanding the fact that one of its subsidiary units was called Taxi
Latino, marketed to the local Spanish-speaking community.16 In all of these
situations, it is clear that ‘English-only’ rules actually undercut the efficient
provision of services by the employees in question. Nevertheless, the appeal
of these rules has been so irresistible to employers that they are sometimes
imposed even when the rules make no business sense at all and, in fact,
undercut business productivity.
Employees facing discipline and job loss under ‘English-only’ rules have
challenged these policies in court, arguing that they are covert forms of
otherwise impermissible discrimination. Obviously, employers could not
lawfully punish or fire workers for being of a particular race or national
origin. If ‘English-only’ rules were intended to allow employers to do
indirectly what they could not do directly, then civil-rights protections
would forbid employers from imposing them. Proving this kind of unlawful
intent, however, is nearly impossible for the workers, since employers
seldom couple the announcement of the restrictive language policy with an
admission of racial or ethnic bias. Being unable to show overt
discriminatory motives leaves the workers in the position of having to argue
instead that, as enforced, the rule has a disparate impact on workers based
on race or national origin. Since only those workers able to speak languages
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other than English will be at risk of violating the ‘English-only’ rule, the
risk of punishment will inevitably fall mainly on racial and ethnic minority
workers. If the workers can establish that the rule, regardless of its facial
neutrality, has a disproportionate negative impact on workers based on race
or national origin—protected categories under civil-rights law—then the
legal burden shifts to the employer to justify the policy in question is based
on a compelling business necessity.17

III. THE COURTS’ TREATMENT OF ‘ENGLISH-ONLY’ RULES AND THE
REALITIES OF BILINGUALISM
Despite the common sense appeal of this reasoning, appellate courts have
mainly rejected employee claims that ‘English-only’ rules constitute
unlawful racial or ethnic discrimination, some even going so far as to deny
that the enforcement of such rules can even be considered to have a
disparate impact on workers based on race or national origin. While it is
true that not every member of an ethnic group knows or chooses to use the
language or languages traditionally associated with that group, and that
likewise some persons may know and use languages unassociated with their
personal ethnic background, it is beyond dispute that, for many individuals,
their mother tongue is a function of their ethnic background.
Notwithstanding this obvious close connection between ethnicity and
language use, most courts have refused to recognize that discrimination
based on language use correlated with ethnic identity constitutes
discrimination on the basis of race or national origin. Why courts have been
unwilling to draw this conclusion is in part based on a tacit yet deep-seated
judicial ideology about the nature of language—an ideology contradicted by
research in the fields of cognitive linguistics and sociolinguistics. Susan Gal
has defined language ideology as “ideas about language [which] are
implicated in the process by which…cultural ideas gave the discursive
authority to become dominant.”18 In this case, unexamined beliefs that
judges hold about language and bilingualism end up shaping their judicial
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reasoning in ways that are fatal to the workers’ claims of discrimination. By
analyzing judicial opinions in these cases, it is possible to see the outlines of
this ideology of language and to observe its incompatibility with
linguistically informed understandings of the nature of language and
communication.
In their analyses of the impact of ‘English-only’ rules on workers whose
native language is not English, appellate judges often minimize the
magnitude of the burdens that attempted compliance with these rules may
place on such workers. In these judicial opinions, there is little
acknowledgement of the centrality of language and communication to
human social interaction. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
characterized speaking with one’s fellow workers on the job as a mere
privilege, one that an employer might choose to magnanimously grant to or
withhold from its workers.19 In the court’s view, as with any other privilege,
its exercise could apparently be conditioned by the employer on any whim
or preference, because the employer was under no obligation at all to permit
the privilege of speaking to other workers while at the workplace.20 In a
1996 case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, asserting “the ability
to converse on the job is a privilege of employment.”21 Having apparently
determined that employers could properly insist that workers spend their
work days in absolute silence, it is the next logical step for these judges to
conclude that, therefore, any lesser restriction on worker communication
must obviously be permissible.
Not all courts have gone quite this far. But even those courts that
recognize that employer power in this regard may not be limitless,
nevertheless, appear to seriously underestimate the magnitude of the burden
that ‘English-only’ rules impose on their workers. Judges often trivialize
this imposition, calling it a mere “inconvenience” to the workers,22 because
of a misunderstanding of bilingual communication and an ignorance of the
realities of bilingual language usage. For instance, since the workers in
question are characterized as “bilingual,” the courts conceptualize the
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impact of the rule as limited, affecting merely a matter of choice of
language, which to a bilingual is of little consequence. As one court
asserted, “It is axiomatic that the language a person who is multilingual
elects to speak at a particular time is a matter of choice.”23 Therefore, in the
court’s view, since bilingual workers could choose to speak in English or in
their native tongue, what might appear to be disparate impact on racial or
ethnic minorities is nothing more than the reflection of free choices they
made to flout the ‘English-only’ rule that they could easily have chosen to
obey.24 As a result, any disproportionate impact is seen instead as a
voluntary exercise of the ethnic workers’ “mere preference” to speak in
their native language and, thus, is unprotected by civil-rights law.25
This analysis by the courts rests on a series of unspoken and unexamined
assumptions about language capacity and communication by bilinguals. As
a threshold matter, it presumes that languages are transparent media of
referential communication such that everything that can be easily and
unproblematically said in one language can also be faithfully rendered in
another. The court’s analysis also assumes that, by definition, a bilingual
person is adept enough in both languages to have satisfactory
communicative competence in either, regardless of the context of language
use or register of language performance. This assumption flattens
distinctions in bilingual competence among bilinguals and ignores
variations in an individual’s linguistic competence depending on context
and domain of language use. A third assumption made in these opinions is
that the specific language used by a bilingual individual is always a
conscious, deliberate choice, which makes the “choice” to speak in a
language other than English an intentional violation of the policy. Finally,
these courts presume that rules banning the use of languages other than
English cannot be considered the equivalent of direct discrimination based
on the ethnicity because language use—being a voluntary choice—is not an
immutable characteristic linked to racial and ethnic identity.26 All of these
assumptions taken together mean that appellate courts cannot conceive of
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any reason why bilingual individuals would ever need to communicate
using any language other than English. In that way, these judges appear to
find it fair and reasonable for employers to require workers to limit their
communication to English use only and to find that any disparate impact is
caused by the acts of the workers, not a function of the employer’s policy.
Each of these judicial assumptions is questionable in light of linguistic
research. Take, for example, the assumption that languages are transparent
media of referential communication, such that every language maps
perfectly onto every other language and anything that can be said in one
language can be easily and perfectly rendered in any other language.
Cognitive linguistic research in bilingualism has demonstrated that there are
many aspects of linguistic meaning that do not, in fact, map seamlessly in
translation. Communication theorists writing about translation have long
appreciated the problems that this poses even for highly fluent translators
and interpreters.27 Lexical tokens in one language have differing ranges of
meaning and semantic connotation.28 Differences in grammar and syntax
also make it difficult to render thoughts conceptualized in one language
transparently into another.29 In fact, recent psycholinguistic research
strongly suggests that what might appear to be minor syntactic distinctions
between languages turn out to have a significant impact on perception,
memory, and expressive recounting of events by speakers of those
languages.30 In other words, linguistic research confirms what many
multilingual speakers appreciate intuitively—that there are many aspects of
meaning “lost” or distorted in translation. To take one example, the Spanish
word ‘machismo’ has no good English language equivalent. ‘Masculinity’
or ‘maleness’ really do not convey the same meaning. As a result, English
speakers familiar with the cultural concept expressed by the word
‘machismo’ have to use that word even in their English language
conversations in order to accurately convey its full meaning. Even speakers
fully fluent in two or more languages are faced with the inevitable gaps and
slippages of meaning resulting from the fact that languages, while
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substantially commensurable, are not fully transparent and equivalent in
their expression of meaning. The ‘lost in translation’ linguistic equivalency
problem becomes much more pronounced when, as is often the case, a
bilingual person has less than full fluency in the nonnative language. There,
breakdown in cross-linguistic communication is more the rule than the
exception.
This brings us to the second assumption made in the legal analysis of
‘English-only’ policies as applied to what are called ‘bilingual’ workers. In
nearly every appellate opinion, the workers in question are described as
‘bilingual,’ meaning having some facility in the use of two languages.
However, courts seldom inquire about the degree of English language
competence possessed by these workers or the extent to which their English
competence varies according to the context and domain of language use.
Rather, the courts assume that the label ‘bilingual’ means that these workers
are fully fluent in both languages and capable of expressing themselves
adeptly in any circumstance. Thus, it seems to these judges quite reasonable
to penalize workers for failing to adhere to ‘English-only’ rules when, by
definition, bilinguals could easily choose to do so. In short, this judicial
reasoning adopts the popular misconception that bilinguals are equivalent to
two fully proficient monolingual native speakers inhabiting the same
speaking mind.31
Reality in these cases is quite different from the perfectly fluent bilingual
workers imagined in the judicial opinions. Instead, bilingual language
competence exists on a continuum of proficiency, with relatively few
bilinguals fully proficient in both languages and a great many bilinguals
with more limited competence in their second language. In most cases,
bilinguals have far less expressive fluency, more limited vocabularies, and
more context-dependent competence in their second language than in their
native tongues.32 Particularly for individuals who do not begin acquiring a
second language in childhood, attaining fluency in a second language as an
adult is seldom realized, even with protracted study and effort.33
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Additionally, it is unreasonable to presume that the workers in these
cases need or are likely to have fluency in the English language. In most of
the cases involving the imposition of ‘English-only’ policies, the bilingual
workers in question are engaged in manual-labor jobs. They are likely to
have received little, if any, formal training in English. Given typical
housing patterns, they are also likely to live in communities where they are
able to use their native languages for most daily activities. Engaged in jobs
that do not require advanced English language skills, these workers are able
to perform their jobs effectively despite frequently having little general
competency in English. They may well have reasonable competence
communicating in English in the limited contextual domain needed for the
accomplishment of repetitive manual tasks. Yet, despite that ability, these
workers may still have insufficient English language proficiency for other
domains of ordinary interpersonal interaction and conversation. In order to
communicate beyond limited task-bounded contexts, these workers would
have little choice but to resort to their native language when their grasp of
English syntax and vocabulary falls short, even if they attempted to
communicate in English as ‘English-only’ rules require. Resorting to a
mixture of both English and their native language can often be the source of
‘English-only’ rules violations.
Linguists have long recognized that bilingual individuals frequently
switch from one language into another, sometimes even in the same
sentence or phrase. The mixing of two languages within one conversational
episode is referred to as code-switching by linguists,34 and it is a necessary
feature of communication for bilinguals who lack fluency in their second
language. Even bilinguals with a high degree of proficiency in their second
language have a tendency to code-switch, sometimes intentionally and often
unwittingly. When code-switching is consciously engaged in, it serves a
number of linguistic functions for the speaker: it may be referential (as
when the speaker does not know or cannot remember the appropriate
English word), expressive (as when the speaker wishes to invoke a
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connotation not easily available in English, or when the speaker wishes to
index an aspect of social identity connected with the use of the other
language), phatic (as when the speaker wishes to change the tone or
formality level of the conversation), or metalinguistic (as when the speaker
is commenting on the language itself, such as musing on how you might say
a particular thing in a second language).35
By ignoring the existence and functions of code-switching, courts can
easily accept employers’ characterizations of bilingual worker violations of
‘English-only’ rules as a kind of willful insubordination that can
legitimately be punished.36 While some code-switching is intentionally done
by speakers,37 many instances of code-switching are, in fact, not within the
conscious control of the speaker.38 Speakers are frequently unaware that
they have code-switched.39 When their code-switching is pointed out,
speakers may apologize for what they see as a lapse of attention and may
promise to be more careful and avoid code-switching in the future.
Nevertheless, they usually resume code-switching in their conversations
despite their best intentions to refrain from it.40 One reason that refraining
from code-switching is so difficult may be the nature of bilingual language
processing. Neurolinguistic research has demonstrated that regardless of
what language is being spoken at the moment, bilinguals keep both
linguistic channels ‘open’ for processing and cannot completely switch off
one language and operate solely in the other.41
One factor that has been shown to trigger unconscious code-switching is
the identity of the bilingual’s conversation partner—a process linguists call
accommodation.42 In other words, bilinguals are most likely to involuntarily
code-switch when speaking with another person whom they know shares
their first language. Since frequently the workplaces in ‘English-only’
litigation are staffed with many bilingual workers, it would be expected that
conversations among them would be marked with a high degree of this kind
of accommodating code-switching—triggered on the part of the speaker by
the ethnic identity of the addressee. Other contextual cues, such as the
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nature of the topic discussed and the emotional valence of the conversation,
can also serve as triggers for unconscious code-switching.43 Circumstances
like these have been described by linguists as characterized by linguistic
interference, in which the vocabulary or morpho-syntactic structure of the
speaker’s dominant language is involuntarily triggered by the context in
which the second language is being used.44 In short, the belief expressed by
employers and adopted in judicial reasoning—that bilinguals always have
full and conscious control over the language in which they express
themselves—is inconsistent with linguistic research on bilingualism.
Instead, the reality of bilingual language use is far more complex and far
less a matter of intentional choice than courts want to believe.
The judicial emphasis on conscious choice in bilinguals’ use of their first
language also enables courts to conclude that ‘English-only’ rules do not
constitute impermissible discrimination based on race or national origin,
notwithstanding the obvious empirical linkage between language use and
ethnic identity. By highlighting native language use as a ‘choice’ made by
bilingual workers, courts draw a distinction between immutable
characteristics of race or national origin—which are seen as deserving of
civil-rights protections—and mutable characteristics associated with race or
ethnic identity, which these courts place outside the protection of Title
VII.45 According to this analysis, only those racial or ethnic attributes that a
person is unable to change give rise to an inference of impermissible
discrimination.46 Courts adopting this reasoning conclude that because
bilingual individuals can choose to use either English or their native
language, the use of their first language is not an immutable characteristic
of their race or national origin and, therefore, is not protected under civilrights law.
Leaving aside the highly debatable matter of whether civil-rights
protections ought to be limited only to immutable characteristics of race or
national origin, the courts’ corollary conclusion that ‘English-only’ rules do
not support even an inference of racial or ethnic discrimination47 is again
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seriously questionable in light of linguistic research on bilingualism and
social identity. It is true that language use and ethnicity are not
automatically and exclusively linked. Some individuals of a particular
national origin will not have command over the language associated with
that origin, just as some individuals without ancestry in that ethnic group
may have proficiency in the language traditionally associated with that
ethnic identity. In that sense, language use is by no means an invariable
attribute of membership in a particular racial or ethnic group, being both
under- and over-inclusive as an index of group identity.
Nevertheless, language does serve as a key resource in the construction
and maintenance of a distinct ethnic and national identity.48 Ethnic identity
represents a core attribute of personal identity in the contemporary world,
highly salient to an individual’s sense of self and to that individual’s sense
of connection to the larger social order.49 Language and ethnic identity are
reciprocally linked, in that language use is a key cultural practice that helps
to constitute ethnic identity, while ethnic identity gives particularized social
meaning to the language choices of speakers.50
Failure to recognize this fundamental social fact about bilingualism
results from the judicial adoption of a linguistic ideology that language is
nothing but a transparent medium of referential communication. This belief,
a mechanistically instrumental view of the nature of language, makes it
difficult for judges to entertain seriously the idea that language has a social
meaning in which the semiotics of language usage is a means of indexing
social identity.51 By asserting that there is no necessary link between
language and ethnicity, it is but an easy step for courts to further insist that
penalizing workers for violating ‘English-only’ rules cannot support even
an inference of discrimination based on race or national origin.52 Through
the application of these erroneous ideas about the nature of language and in
particular the nature of bilingualism, judges come to the conclusion that
‘English-only’ rules constitute neither direct evidence of unlawful
discrimination against workers based on race and national origin nor even
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evidence supporting a claim of disparate impact on workers on that basis.
Thus, in the view of most courts, workers whose first language is something
other than English cannot establish that ‘English-only’ restrictions entitle
them to relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

IV. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR ‘ENGLISH ONLY’ RULES
Having concluded that ‘English-only’ rules by employers are not prima
facie evidence of discrimination, courts usually find it legally unnecessary
to go further in their analysis and ask whether employers have a compelling
business necessity justifying actions that might impose a disproportionate
burden on racial and ethnic minorities in their workforce. Nevertheless,
some courts have proceeded to render an opinion as to whether ‘Englishonly’ restrictions on workers might be legitimate due to compelling
business needs of the employer. Courts that have taken this next analytic
step have almost always been exceedingly deferential to employer claims,
finding that their language restrictions on employees are justified based on
overriding business needs.53 In fact, any recitation at all of a businessnecessity basis for ‘English-only’ policies—even a conclusory assertion that
the policy was needed so that the business would run “smoothly and
efficiently”—has been accepted at face value by courts on this issue.54
When pressed for more specific justifications based on business
necessity, employers have made two more specific claims about their need
to restrict workers’ abilities to speak in their native languages at the
workplace. First, these policies are presumably justified in order to assure a
safe and efficient workplace.55 Second, employers assert that a monolingual
workplace is necessary in order to promote racial and ethnic harmony on
the job.56 However, an examination of the evidence in these situations
undermines both of these claimed rationales. If employers had the burden of
justifying these restrictions based on business necessity, they would
probably be unable to do so.
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The idea that a monolingual work environment would enhance safety and
efficiency has superficial appeal. Common sense would suggest that a
monolingual workplace would promote more efficient worker
communication than would a multilingual job site. Perhaps in a
hypothetical, monolingual world this would be true. But we do not live in a
monolingual world. In the real world—a world populated by workers of
widely varying degrees of English language competency—workers may
find it difficult, even impossible, to perform their work safely and
efficiently if all communication must be exclusively in English.
Cooperation with fellow workers may be stymied when workers cannot
discuss the tasks at hand in the shared language in which they have the
greatest facility. They may fail to understand safety warnings in English and
be unable to adequately inform other workers or supervisors of dangerous
conditions they see on the job simply because they cannot communicate
fluently in English. In many of the litigated cases in which workers were
punished for violating ‘English-only’ rules, the offending non-English
language was spoken between two workers who shared the fluent use of the
language in question.57 Ironically, in such cases, requiring workers with
limited command of English to use that language alone would actually
result in a less efficient and less safe working environment than if the
workers were permitted to communicate in their shared native language.
If appeals to workplace efficiency and safety as justification for ‘Englishonly’ rules in linguistically diverse workplaces turn out to be of dubious
validity, then employer justifications based on a desire to promote racial
and ethnic harmony in the workplace are even less plausible. One of the
frequently asserted reasons for banning languages other than English in the
workplace is the suspicion by monolingual English-speaking workers that
their fellow workers are making derogatory comments about them when
they speak in their native languages.58 In none of the reported appellate
cases was there any evidence introduced whatsoever that bilingual workers
were in fact making insulting or mocking comments about their English-
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speaking co-workers. Yet, employers responded to these groundless worries
by imposing ‘English-only’ policies anyway. While this kind of paranoid
suspicion could certainly contribute to an ethnically divided workplace, it
could surely be better addressed by implementing policies forbidding
employees to insult or harass one another regardless of the language used to
do so. Restricting communication by bilinguals is hardly calculated to result
in the asserted goal of achieving an ethnically harmonious workplace.
In fact, if promotion of an ethnically harmonious workplace is indeed the
goal of the imposition of ‘English-only’ rules, the evidence from appellate
cases suggests that imposition of these policies backfires badly. When
employers adopt these restrictive policies, the evidence shows that
workplaces tend to become more ethnically polarized and tense as a direct
result.59 Bilingual workers who are subject to the ‘English-only’ restrictions
complain that they are mocked by English-speaking co-workers and bosses
for their accented and nonstandard use of English.60 They report being
singled out by supervisors and threatened with discipline if they slip up and
use their native language, creating a tense atmosphere in which the
possibility of being fired looms constantly.61 Bilinguals’ fear of losing their
jobs for violating the language restrictions—a worry their English-speaking
monolingual co-workers do not experience—can only result in an increased
ethnic polarization of the workplace as bilingual workers are fired and
replaced with monolingual English speakers.62 Unable to express
themselves adequately in a language in which they have limited
competence,63 bilingual workers testify that they feel humiliation because of
their inability to communicate effectively. Deprived of the ability to have
ordinary social interaction with their fellow workers, they resent being
placed at a distinct disadvantage compared with their monolingual Englishspeaking co-workers who are permitted to converse freely with one
another.64 Yet, despite this evidence proffered by the affected workers,
courts have consistently rejected the workers’ assertions that the
enforcement of restrictive ‘English-only’ policies creates a hostile
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workplace environment that is tantamount to direct racial or ethnic
discrimination.65
Unsurprisingly, many bilingual workers come to feel that it is their ethnic
identity itself that is the target of ‘English-only’ policies. Not infrequently,
supervisors and co-workers directly attack that identity in the course of
imposing these policies. For example, in one case, a worker reported that
her employer “screamed” at her to “go back to your own country” when she
was overheard speaking Spanish to a fellow employee.66 In another case, a
worker testified that while being fired for violating the ‘English-only’
restrictions at work, his supervisor told him to “go home and sit on his
Puerto Rican bum.”67 Still another worker, told by his boss, “We don’t
tolerate any ‘Mesican’ (sic) talk” on the job, concluded that his ethnic
heritage was being singled out for disrespect and that it was his employer’s
hostility to his ethnicity that explained his being fired.68
In some cases, there is no need to speculate about whether the policy is a
product of ethnic hostility since the employers’ use of ethnic slurs betrays
that fact. In one such case, a manager came upon two employees speaking
Spanish at lunch and swore at them, saying, “Wetbacks, I wish you would
speak where I can understand you.” In fact, the newly-imposed ‘Englishonly’ rule in that business was announced with a sign stating, “Absolutely
No Guns, Knives, or Weapons of any kind are allowed on these Premises at
any time! English is the official language of Premier Operator Services Inc.
All conversations on these premises are to be in English.”69 It is easy to see
why a policy lumping together the possession of deadly weapons with the
speaking of foreign languages might seem to the affected bilingual workers
as a sign that they themselves were being demonized as dangerous.
Alienated by these restrictive policies from their employers and
monolingual fellow workers, bilingual workers testify that ‘English-only’
rules create an “atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation” on
the job.70 Far from promoting ethnic harmony in the workplace, these
polices appear instead to be a recipe for creating a tense workplace
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environment where not only do racial and ethnic divisions between workers
become amplified and sharpened, but inter-ethnic resentment and hostility
are also fueled.

V. CONCLUSION
As I have argued above, the imposition and legal justification of
employers’ ‘English-only’ restrictions on bilingual workers are facilitated
by certain ideological beliefs about language and communication that courts
unreflectively deploy. Because that ideology is seldom consciously
recognized or overtly articulated, however, it is largely impervious to
challenge. Even when plaintiffs challenging these policies proffer expert
witnesses with linguistic and anthropological expertise to testify as to the
impact of these language restrictions on affected workers, courts appear not
to seriously consider that evidence. Sadly, when research-based expert
knowledge contradicts judicial ‘common sense’ ideological beliefs,
ideology beats science. This critical analysis of ‘English-only’ rules in the
workplace exposes one aspect of linguistic ideology in the law and its
hegemonic nature.71 The law’s resulting unwillingness to take seriously the
burden that ‘English-only’ restrictions impose on bilingual workers puts
those workers at a serious disadvantage in an already difficult job market.
Unfortunately, that disadvantage is likely to become more pervasive as
more employers adopt language restrictions in the workplace. As Judge
Reinhardt noted in his dissent to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s denial
of the petition for rehearing in Garcia v. Spun Steak, the “present mood of
anti-immigration backlash means that English Only rules are likely to
become more prevalent.”72 Since that 1993 case, anti-immigrant sentiment
has certainly not declined, and arguably has even intensified. In the absence
of explicit protection in law for linguistic minorities, civil-rights law as
currently interpreted is unlikely to provide legal redress when bilingual
workers find themselves marginalized, disciplined, and fired for their
inability to comply with ‘English-only’ rules.
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